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OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW
imprudent investments. Because most utilities function outside the mainstream
of market competition and have little incentive to minimize costs, regulatory
agencies at the state and federal levels should coordinate their powers to pro-
tect the ratepayer, who ultimately bears the burden of high costs and im-
prudent investments. The most effective ways to protect the ratepayer are
(1) to minimize the cost of construction and licensing, and (2) to prevent any
expenditures for inappropriate or imprudent construction. Effective prevention
will require close supervision of utility expenditures and of the traditional
management functions of planning and supervision. Such intervention is
necessary to protect ratepayers because utilities are not subject to market
pressures.
Susan Marshall Bacon
Editor's Note: The United States Supreme Court has recently recognized
that the Atomic Energy Act does not compel the promotion of nuclear power
"at all costs." In its opinion on the appeal of Pacific Gas & Electric Co.
v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Development Commission,6 the
Court upheld the validity of section 25524.2 of the California Public Resources
Code. The Court accepted California's avowed economic basis for banning
the construction of nuclear generators until such time as adequate waste
disposal techniques become available, and noted that the statute expressly main-
tained the authority of the federal government to approve disposal techniques.
In rejecting the petitioners' claim of implied preemption, the Court stated:
"[The] legal reality remains that Congress has left sufficient authority in the
states to allow the development of nuclear power to be slowed or even stopped
for economic reasons."70
Public Utilities: The Black Fox Nuclear Project
Cancellation Dilemma: Of Judicial Review and
Reform of Oklahoma's Administrative Process*
The unexpected cancellation of electrical generating projects has given rise
to a number of significant economic and legal issues. This note examines who
shall bear the cost of abandoned projects and the subsequent problems created
for the administrative agencies engaged in the regulation of utility rates. Until
very recently, the subject was of limited interest because the cancellation of
generating projects was rare.' However, with the unanticipated downturn in
69. 51 U.S.L.W. 4449 (U.S., Apr. 20, 1983).
70. Id. at 4457.
* This paper was awarded the Eugune 0. Kuntz Scholarship for 1983, presented by H.B.
Watson, Jr., Partner, Watson, McKenzie & Moricoli, Oklahoma City.-Ed.
1. Bruder, Recovery of Losses on Cancelled Projects: Basic Issues, in ELEcTRIC POWER:
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the demand for electrical energy and the financial and regulatory difficulties
that have particularly beset the nuclear industry, many large-scale projects
have been abandoned after staggering amounts of capital have been invested
in planning, licensing, and acquiring equipment.2 The subject of cancellation
amortization (abandonment write-off) is now of intense interest to public
regulatory commissions, public utilities, and consumers. Within the last few
years, "the precedent on the subject suddenly has become rich."
3
Oklahoma came face to face with this modern controversy when the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the state's principal regulatory agency
over rate changes,' ruled that Public Service Company of Oklahoma (P.S.O.)
could recover more than $158 million in losses from cancellation of the Black
Fox nuclear power project. The Commission decided that P.S.O. may include
the Black Fox loss in rate charges to their customers over an amortization
period of the next ten years. This action is expected to increase the monthly
electric bill by $2.28 for a residential customer who consumes 800 kilowatt
hours of electricity per month.' P.S.O. canceled Black Fox under Commis-
sion recommendation,6 when it was determined the total cost of finishing the
project was too excessive.
7
The regulatory agencies, the utility industry, and the courts must confront
the realities, both legal and economic, presented by these unexpected and extra-
ordinary circumstances. The critical question facing the various state regulatory
commissions, as well as the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC),
is who is to pay for the costs associated with the abandonment of generating
plants before they are operable and before they are of any use to the customer.
Should the utilities' shareholders absorb the loss? Should the consumers? Or
is there a mechanism by which the expenditures may be equitably apportioned
between the parties?
The importance of these proceedings cannot be understated. As the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission stated in its order dealing with the Black
Fox amortization: "IThis case may well be one of the most important to
come before this Commission in the course of its history to date."8
CURRENT IssuEs IN REGULATION AND FINAN ING 167, 169 (Practicing Law Institute, 1982)
[hereinafter cited as Bruder].
2. A recent Nuclear Regulatory Commission report estimated that electric utilities are likely
to cancel another 19 nuclear power reactors in various phases of construction, only four of which
are more than 20% complete. Most of the remainder are less than 10% complete. 10 ENERGY
USERs REP. (BNA) 271-72 (Mar. 18, 1982). Ninety-one nuclear power plants have been canceled
over the past decade. 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 900 (Sept. 2, 1982).
3. Bruder, supra note 1, at 169.
4. Jurisdiction of the Corporation Commission is based upon its general regulatory power
pursuant to article 9, § 18, and related sections of the Oklahoma constitution and the statutory
provisions contained in 17 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-271 (1981).
5. 10 ENERGY USER REP. (BNA) 564-65 (June 10, 1982).
6. 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 99 (Jan. 28, 1982).
7. 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 565 (June 10, 1982).
8. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Cause No. 27068, Order No. 206560, at 62 (Okla. Corp.
Comm'n, Jan. 15, 1982) [hereinafter cited as P.S.O. Order].
19831
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol36/iss1/36
OKLAHOMA LA W REVIEW
I. The Black Fox Nuclear Project
Project History
The Black Fox nuclear power station is a 2,206-acre site located 23 miles
east of Tulsa, near the city of Inola in Rogers County.' The Public Service
Company of Oklahoma, a public utility with its principal offices in Tulsa,
is primary owner and operator of the project. P.S.O. is a corporation organized
and existing under the laws of the state of Oklahoma and is a wholly owned
subsidiary of Central and Southwest Corporation, a registered holding com-
pany located in Wilmington, Delaware. The company has plant, property,
and other assets dedicated to and for the generation, transmission, distribu-
tion, and sale of electric power and energy to the public in fifty-one counties
in the state of Oklahoma.'"
Owning approximately a 61% share in the Black Fox project, P.S.O. has
operated as project manager since the plan's inception. The company's other
partners in the power station are Western Farmers Electric Cooperative of
Anadarko, Oklahoma, and Associated Electric Cooperative, Inc., of Spring-
field, Missouri, both rural electric cooperatives."
P.S.O. has been involved in nuclear research and development since 1957.
In 1968, P.S.O. prepared and issued a power-generation expansion study that
evaluated the economics of natural gas, coal, and nuclear fuel as potential
boiler fuels. The study concluded that because of the uncertainties surround-
ing the future costs and availability of natural gas, the company's system should
be planned to provide for a fully diversified fuel mix by the addition of coal-
fired and nuclear-fueled generating stations. In January 1973, P.S.O.
announced its intent to construct a nuclear power plant near Inola, Oklahoma,
and thereafter filed an application with the Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sion,' in which P.S.O. informed the Commission of its intent to build a
nuclear-powered generating facility at the Inola site. After hearing evidence,
the Commission issued its Order No. 100753 on October 24, 1973, finding
that the site was an appropriate location for a generating facility. The Com-
mission further found that it had no authority to approve the type and kind
of generating station planned because federal legislation preempted such a
decision.'3 The Federal Nuclear Regulatory Commission's (NRC) preemptive
9. 1 Public Service Company of Oklahoma, Black Fox Station Units One and Two (En.
vironmental Report) 2.1-1 (1974).
10. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 4.
11. Id. at 46. Western Farmers Electric Cooperative owns 17.391% of the Black Fox Station
and as of Aug. 31, 1981, had invested $64,618.095.05 in the project. Associated Electric
Cooperative, Inc. owns 21.739% of the project and as of Sept. 30," 1981, had invested
$84,282,516.69.
12. Public Service Co. of Oklahoma, Cause No. 24893 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n, Jan. 1973).
More than fifty prospective sites were originally contemplated by P.S.O. for the location of
the Black Fox facility. Daily Oklahoman, Jan. 24, 1983, at 1, col. 1. For an excellent article
concerning power plant siting, including a brief discussion on Black Fox, see Young, Power
Plant Siting and the Environment, 26 OKLA. L. REV. 193 (1973).
13. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 44.
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authority extends to the construction, operation, and decommissioning of
nuclear power plants and all safety issues associated therewith.1 4 From that
point until 1981, all regulatory activity in connection with the Black Fox nuclear
power project was restricted to proceedings before the NRC.
From 1973 through early 1979, proceedings were held before the Nuclear
Regulatory Commission covering all aspects of the project, including
economics, engineering, environmental, and safety considerations." On July
26, 1978, the United States Atomic Safety and Licensing Board issued a limited
work authorization for nonsafety-related work, and construction began on
the project immediately thereafter. In February 1979, the NRC's safety hear-
ings were completed and P.S.O. had satisfied all requirements for a construc-
tion permit.'6 At the close of those hearings, P.S.O. performed a complete
cost assessment and scheduling update in anticipation of receiving a construc-
tion permit by July 1979.17
In March 1979, an accident occurred at the Three Mile Island Unit Two
nuclear facility near Harrisburg, Pennsylvania. The impact of this accident
was not immediately known, but P.S.O. made efforts to obtain specific in-
formation concerning new licensing requirements for the Black Fox station.
By the fall of 1979, it became apparent that the NRC had declared a mor-
torium of uncertain duration on nuclear licensing activities."6 Faced with uncer-
tainty as to when a construction permit would be received, P.S.O. demobilized
its field activities on the Black Fox station and placed the project in what
P.S.O. officials termed a "survival mode."' 9 Because of the uncertainties with
respect to the licensing requirements and procedures, P.S.O. determined that
it would be impractical to update the $2.39 billion cost estimate it had made
in April of 1979 that was predicated on in-service dates for Black Fox Units
One and Two of 1985 and 1988, respectively.0
14. Id. A decision of immense proportions in the area of federal preemption of nuclear power
was handed down by the United States Supreme Court on April 20, 1983. In Pacific Gas &
Elec. Co. v. State Energy Resources Conservation & Dev. Comm'n, 51 U.S.L.W. 4449 (U.S.
Apr. 19, 1983), the Court (in a 9-0 ruling) upheld a California moratorium on nuclear power
plants until the federal government devises a safe method for disposing of radioactive waste.
The moratorium on construction is aimed not at public safety but at the economic problems
associated with the lack of federally approved nuclear waste disposal facilities. The decision upheld
the prior Ninth Circuit opinion, 659 F.2d 903 (9th Cir. 1981), which read the Atomic Energy
Act to evince a clear congressional intent to preempt state regulatory powers in the areas of
radiation hazards alone, and to preserve the powers of the states to regulate nuclear plants for
any other purpose. The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 regulates safety aspects of nuclear plant
construction but leaves to the states their traditional responsibilities of regulating electrical utilities
concerning issues of need, reliability, rate-making, and other related state concerns. The Court's
opinion did not specify what effect its ruling has on the nuclear power plants now under con-
struction. See Oklahoma City Times, Apr. 20, 1983, at 1, col. 1.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 45.
17. Id.
18. Id.
19. Id.
20. Id.
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On August 27, 1981, the NRC approved new regulations for the licensing
of nuclear facilities." As a result of this action by the NRC and in response
to an Oklahoma Corporation Commission order, P.S.O. retained professional
consulting firms to perform a cost and schedule update and a study of the
cost of a comparable coal-fired generating facility.
22
From September 14 through November 10, 1981, the merits of P.S.O.'s
application for a rate adjustment in Oklahoma were heard before the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission, en banc.23 On January 15, 1982, the
Commission called Black Fox a "profound risk" and in Order No. 206560
recommended that it be canceled.2' The Commission suggested instead that
P.S.O. build a coal-fired generating station to meet its future power needs .2
By now P.S.O. had spent approximately $200 million in engineering and site
preparation for Black Fox, which was to have a 2,300-megawatt capacity.2 6
On February 16, 1982, P.S.O. announced the withdrawal of its application
with the NRC for construction of Black Fox, citing regulatory uncertainties
and escalating costs of more than $10 billion. 7
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission ruled on June 3, 1982, in Order
No. 217735, that P.S.O. could begin recovering more than $158 million in
losses from the cancellation of the Black Fox project.28 P.S.O. President Martin
E. Fate, Jr., said his company had accepted an option from the Corporation
Commission that would permit the company to bill customers for a large por-
tion of the costs to date of the nuclear plant.2 9 The Commission actually ap-
proved the concept of customer payment for the construction cancellation
in the January 15 order, in which it also approved a $79.1 million P.S.O.
rate increase, the largest ever granted an Oklahoma utility.20
21. Id.
22. Id. at 46.
23. Id. at 3.
24. 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 25, 1982).
25. 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 99 (Jan. 28, 1982).
26. Id.
27. 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 25, 1982). On that same date, the Attorney
General filed his Petition in Error initiating this appeal. It should be noted that P.S.O. filed
a cross-appeal on Feb. 26, 1982, with respect to certain rate provisions of Order No. 206560.
The utility urged that the Commission's order acted to deprive P.S.O. of its property without
just compensation in violation of the Constitution of the United States and the Oklahoma con-
stitution, by establishing rates and charges inadequate to allow P.S.O. the opportunity to achieve
a reasonable rate of return on property devoted to its public service duties.
28. 10 ENERGY USERs REP. (BNA) 564-65 (June 10, 1982).
29. 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 25, 1982).
30. Id. There appears to be some question as to whether Order No. 206560 is a final order
under Oklahoma law and therefore not appealable. The appellees could argue that the portions
of the order dealing with the Black Fox order are not appealable under OKu.A. CONST. art. 9,
§ 20 because the Commission order does not "set a rate." The appellant may counter by contend-
ing that supreme court review is not restricted to a review of only those orders that specifically
set out a fixed numerical rate, but includes the power to review orders of the Commission, which,
in essence, affect and control rates. Regardless of any "semantic jousting," this writer contends
that the approved "concept" of capital recovery is sufficiently ripe for appellate review because
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The Commission decided that P.S.O. could include the Black Fox loss in
charges to its customers over the next ten years, which is expected to increase
a monthly electric bill by $2.28 for a residential customer who consumes 800
kilowatt hours of electricity per month.3
On November 26, 1982, P.S.O. officially announced its long-range plans
to build and operate several coal-powered units at the site originally planned
for the Black Fox nuclear project. Although actual construction is not ex-
pected to commence any earlier than 1987, the tentative schedule calls for
the first unit of Inola Station to provide commercial service in 1992, followed
by a second unit in 1994. Plans call for a total of four units eventually to
be built at the site.
32
The Oklahoma Corporation Commission's Decision
The Commission hearing in September 1981 was divided into three phases.
33
Phase three dealt with the specific issues relating to the Black Fox nuclear
project, including whether to continue with the project, the financial impact
on customers, and the potential capital recovery methods. Certain participants
had considerable input into the proceeding: (1) Public Service Company, its
partners in the project, and Oklahoma Industries for Fair Utility Rates; (2)
consumer intervenors, such as the Coalition for Fair Utility Rates, Inc.,
Citizens' Action for Safe Energy, Inc., the Oklahoma Chapter of the Sierra
Club; and (3) the Office of the Attorney General for the state of Oklahoma
and the staff of the Corporation Commission.
3 4
The Corporation Commission considered three principal issues in phase three
of the proceeding: an economic analysis of nuclear versus coal construction
costs; prudence in retrospect; and the issue of capital recovery and amortiza-
tion.
(a) Economic Analysis of Nuclear Versus Coal Construction Costs
The Corporation Commission heard extensive testimony comparing the
relative economic advantages of nuclear- versus coal-fired generating capacity.3'
A private firm, employed by the Commission staff, developed generic con-
struction cost estimates for a nuclear facility equivalent to the Black Fox pro-
the subsequent Order No. 217735 only substituted dollar amounts in the forumla set forth in
Order No. 206560.
31. 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 565 (June 10, 1982).
32. Saturday Oklahoman & Times, Nov. 27, 1982, at 38, col. 1. The total size of the 1992
unit is yet to be determined as the other Black Fox station joint owners have to evaluate their
interest in owning capacity. At present P.S.O.'s participation in the 1922 unit is set at 248 mega-
watts. The other companies own 192 megawatts. See 11 PuB. UTm. FORT. 48, 49 (Jan. 6, 1983).
33. In phases one and two of the hearing, the Commission found P.S.O.'s jurisdictional
rate base to be $710,765,828. The net operating income for the test year was determined to be
$42,495,212. The Commission also ruled that P.S.O. should be allowed to earn an overall rate
of return of 12.313%. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 13, 23, 25.
34. Id. at 3.
35. Id. at 46.
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ject and for coal-fired plants with comparable capacity. The firm concluded
the nuclear construction project would cost in the range of $8.18 billion to
$10.12 billion and that the coal-fired units would cost in the range of $5 billion
to $5.8 billion.3" A delay of one year would escalate the cost estimate for
the nuclear facility by $1.06 billion. 7
The consulting firm representing the consumer intervenors estimated the
capital costs for the construction of such a nuclear project would be $15.1
billion, whereas the estimate of equivalent coal-fired capacity was $3.11
billion.3"
Public Service Company's consulting engineers testified that barring
unreasonable delays in construction and assuming licensing would proceed
on a straightforward basis, the cost of construction of a coal plant of equivalent
capacity to the Black Fox project would be $2.8 billion. However, it was
estimated that P.S.O. had a 10% probability of completing the nuclear pro-
ject in the 1991 to 1993 time frame. It was further projected that the com-
pany had a 50% probability of completing the project with Unit One in ser-
vice in 1993 and Unit Two in service in 1995 at a total cost of $6.62 billion."
After the presentation of evidence, the Commission emphasized that P.S.O.'s
customers would experience a substantial increase in their rates, regardless
of whether a nuclear or a coal facility were built.40 However, the Commission
determined that the construction of a nuclear plant would have a substantially
greater impact on consumers' bills in the short run than would conversion
to a coal-fired generating station. The Commission noted a probable greater
cost impact with nuclear power over the long run because of particular risks
and uncertainties,' discussed later in this note. There was, however, evidence
indicating the feasibility of bringing a nuclear unit "on line" within twelve
years, thereby giving nuclear capacity a slight advantage over coal capacity.
42
The Commission emphasized two factors in these cost projections. First,
any significant increase in the cost of nuclear plant construction,' caused by
delay or other factors, would shift the equation in favor of coal.'3 Second,
probabilistic and comparative analysis research indicated that the Black Fox
project had no better than a 50% probability of being completed by the 1993
and 1995 in-service dates. Nevertheless, it was the Commission's opinion that
the study disregarded the effects of a significant nuclear incident, such as
Three Mile Island, which could cause a substantial delay in the ultimate in-
service dates of the two nuclear units. Any delay would give an economic
advantage to coal.
4"
36. Id. at 47.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 48.
40. Id. at 50.
41. Id. at 51.
42. Id. at 52.
43. Id.
44. Id.
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The Commission took specific notice of the problems of federal preemption
in the nuclear energy area: "the entire industry is at the mercy of the attitude
of the administration in office."" The Commission observed that there would
be at least three general elections with three potential changes in nuclear energy
policy before the most optimistic in-service dates for the Black Fox units,
' 6
stating, "We have already experienced the impact of a federal government
unwilling or unable to reach timely decisions in the areas of standards and
licensing of nuclear generating plants.
'47
The Commission also recognized potential problems with the reliability of
fuel supply. Because of exclusive federal regulation of nuclear power plants,
the fuel supply would be plagued by additional risks even after a nuclear plant
is constructed. A problem at one power plant could cause a shutdown order
to be issued to all plants of similar design. Thus, a utility with a nuclear plant
may suffer loss of capacity because of another utility's problem."'
In concluding that P.S.O., and its co-owners, Western Farmers Electric
Cooperative and Associated Electric, should not proceed with the project,
the Corporation Commission relied on evidence establishing that Black Fox
faced construction, financial, regulatory, and political risks, each of which
could adversely impact the capital costs and construction scheduling associated
with the project. Taking these risks into consideration, together with the cost
projections, the Commission emphasized that the Black Fox nuclear power
station project
is no longer economically viable; that Construction Work in Pro-
gress for the project should not be allowed in Applicant's rate base;
and that expenditures made from and after the date of this Order
in the furtherance of the Black Fox project, will be considered by
us to be imprudently undertaken for Oklahoma jurisdiction rate-
making purposes.9
In summing up its recommendation, the Commission stated:
Applicant and its co-owners should take immediate steps to cancel
this project so that losses in connection with this project can be
minimized. In reaching this conclusion, we recognize that the
decision to construct or to continue to construct an electric
generating station is a decision which under Oklahoma law rests
exclusively with management of our electric utilities. At the same
time however, this Commission can and will continue to protect
Oklahoma ratepayers from imprudent management decisions.50
P.S.O. was given thirty days to consult with its partners and advise the
45. Id. at 53.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 54 (emphasis added).
1983]
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Commission of its intentions." On February 16, 1982, officials for P.S.O.
officially canceled the Black Fox project.1
2
(b) Prudence in Retrospect
A second issue considered by the Corporation Commission was whether
P.S.O. acted imprudently, either in the initial undertaking or in a failure to
discontinue the project at any time thereafter until September 1, 1981." The
Commission emphasized that such a determination must not be distorted by
the fact that "hindsight has 20-20 vision," and that judgment must be made
from the perspective of what was known or reasonably should have been
known by the management at the time the decisions were made.14
The Commission considered several factors determinative. First, at the time
P.S.O. decided to construct a nuclear power plant, a shortage of natural gas
was perceived to exist in the United States. In addition, the federal govern-
ment was at that time actively promoting nuclear energy for electric genera-
tion. Based upon these perceptions, management concluded it would be
necessary to diversify into both coal and nuclear generation in order to main-
tain reliable service."
The Arab oil embargo of 1973 escalated the price of natural gas and high-
lighted the need to utilize other sources of fuel. In recognition of this factor,
together with the perceived shortage of natural gas, Congress enacted the Power
Plant and Industrial Fuel Use Act of 1978.56 This legislation, as initially
enacted, substantially increased the -need for Oklahoma utilities to diversify
their boiler fuels.1
7
Second, with the accident at Three Mile Island, the entire nuclear industry
entered a period of profound uncertainty. Arguments were made that manage-
ment should have known then that the risks associated with nuclear power
51. Id. at 61.
52. 10 ENERGY Usmts REP. (BNA) 211 (Feb. 25, 1982).
53. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 54.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 55.
56. Pub. L. No. 95-620, 92 Stat. 3289 (codified in scattered sections of 15, 42, 45 and 49
U.S.C.). The Act is designed to promote coal conversion by prohibiting the use of oil and gas
in some existing and in some new boilers. The Act is part of the National Energy Act, signed
into -law by President Carter in November 1978. In addition to the Powerplant and Industrial
Fuel Use Act, the National Energy Act is composed of four other pieces of legislation: the National
Engery Conservation Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. § 8201, designed to set standards and provide loans,
audits, and grants for conservation in buildings; the Public Utility Regulatory Policies Act (PURPA),
in scattered sections of 15, 16, 30, 42, and 43 U.S.C., which encourages, but does not require,
states to adopt new rate design standards that promote conservation and.that may shift rising
energy costs.to different classes of consumers; the Natural Gas Policy Act, 15 U.S.C. § 3301,
designed to create a unified natural gas market rather than separate ones for interstate and intra-
state sales. The Act also provides for the deregulation of certain natural gas, incremental pricing
and curtailment procedures; Energy Tax Act, in scattered sections of 23 and 26 U.S.C., which
promotes investment and use of conservation and unconventional sources through the use of
credits and investment tax credits. See J. TomAn, EN GY LAw IN A NUTsnEL. (1981).
57. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 55.
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were so severe as to require the owners to cancel Black Fox immediately.
However, the Commission reasoned that the federal government had been
actively encouraging the use of nuclear energy and, therefore, it was not
unreasonable for management o assume that once the Three Mile Island in-
cident had been investigated, the federal government would return to its
previous supportive position. The federal government and the NRC, in fact,
were dilatory in their resolution of the issues raised by the incident and have
not issued a new construction permit since.8
Third, the Commission deduced that P.S.O. did not act imprudently in
assuming a "caretaker" status for the project. The federal government, by
falling to define its policy in a timely fashion, was, in effect, responsible for
a de facto moratorium on new construction. Recognizing this moratorium,
P.S.O. management hen reverted to a caretaker status to minimize expenses
on the project while attempting to preserve its already substantial investment.
Without specific direction from the NRC concerning the future of nuclear
energy, and the Black Fox project in particular, the Commission concluded
that management did not act imprudently.59
The Commission summarized its position on the issue of prudence by stating:
When the decisions of management are viewed as we have done
from the perspective of the time in which those decisions were made,
we believe that Applicant's decisions concerning this project were
appropriate. The fact that different people would have, could have,
or did reach differing conclusions does not render the decisions
of this company imprudent. Accordingly, we conclude that we
should provide this Applicant with our evaluation of the capital
recovery treatment which should be given in the event a timely deci-
sion is reached to cancel this project.60
(c) The Issue of Capital Recovery and Amortization
The dominant issue before the Corporation Commission, and soon to be
before the Oklahoma Supreme Court, is whether P.S.O. should be allowed
to recover its investment in the Black Fox Station project after cancellation.
Because of the importance of the Commission's reasoning and for purposes of
analysis, much of the actual language used by the Corporation Commission
is reprinted below.
The Commission initiated its discussion of the Black Fox capital recovery
issue by recognizing the widely divergent positions advocated by the various
parties. P.S.O. urged the Commission to grant a full return on write-off of
the investment, or at least a return on equity equivalent to its current dividend
58. Id. There has not been a domestic order for a nuclear plant since 1978. 10 ENERGY USERS
REP. (BNA) 900 (Sept. 2, 1982). Utilities are now committed to 147 nuclear reactors: 83 licensed
to operate, 59 with construction permits, and 5 on order. 11 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 91
(Jan. 20, 1983).
59. Id. at 56.
60. Id.
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rate. The Coalition for Fair Utility Rates, a consumer group, advocated there
should be no allowance for a write-off of the investment through the rate
base, although the Coalition recognized the Commission's duty to ensure the
financial soundness of the utilities that fall under Commission jurisdiction.
Still, the Oklahoma Chapter of the Sierra Club urged the adoption of a risk-
sharing concept proposed by Touche Ross and Company for the Commission
staff. The staff's proposal, in essence, was for both the stockholders and the
ratepayers to share in the capital loss in such a way that the company would
maintain its economic viability while minimizing the impact on P.S.O.'s
ratepayers.6
Perhaps most noteworthy was the Oklahoma Attorney General's opinion,
as cited by the Commission in the Black Fox order: "As for allowing the
Applicant to recover roughly $200 million worth of Black Fox investment,
this Intervenor feels the recovery at the expense of the ratepayer is unwarrant-
ed.... It has been P.S.O.'s decision all along and as such, they should bear
the losses associated therewith."' 6
2
In justifying its decision on recovery of capital costs, the Commission ap-
plied the following rationale:
A public utility company is not permitted to enjoy the full fruits
of its business successes in as much as regulation prohibits a return
higher than that which is required to attract capital and provide
service at reasonable rates. As a result, it does not have the resources
available to absorb the major adversities which it encounters. In
the event that Public Service Company and its co-owners conclude
not to proceed with the construction of the Black Fox project, as
a nuclear facility, and in view of management's prudence which
we have found to exist at this point in the history of the project,
we conclude that some mechanism for recovery of the investment
in this project which would be written off must be recognized. To
do otherwise, that is, to refuse to allow Applicant a mechanism
for recovery of the extraordinary loss associated with this project
would result in this Company immediately experiencing negative
retained earnings for several years. The possibility exists that the
Applicant would be placed in receivership. We take judicial notice
of the fact that bankruptcy would result in the immediate escala-
tion of a utility's embedded cost of debt to current interest rate
levels. The evidence establishes Applicant's long term debt at test
year end to be approximately $503 million with a cost rate of
9.11470. Assuming a current interest rate of 1507, bankruptcy
would require the customers of the company to pay .nearly $30
million more per year just to cover the added interest costs. The
utility would immediately lose its credit rating and its access to
the capital market. In our judgment the quality of service now ex-
61. Id. at 57.
62. Id. at 56.
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perienced by the company's ratepayers would deteriorate rapidly,
and the costs to Oklahoma ratepayers of restoring this company
to financial health would be substantially greater than the costs
associated with a recovery of this investment. In making his recom-
mendation we do not believe the Attorney General intends this
result.
Our decision to recommend against proceeding with the Black
Fox Nuclear Project was made in large part because we could not
subject the customers of P.S.O. to the substantial risks and uncer-
tainties attendant to this project. Similarly, we cdnnot assign to
the Company's ratepayees the profound risks of a bankrupt utility
unable to meet its obligations.
Bankruptcy is not a viable option. The evidence in this case
establishes and our independent search confirms that there is no
standard treatment for abandonment of a plant such as this in the
United States. Short of requiring the Company to absorb such a
loss below the line, two viable capital recovery alternative scenarios
are available to us: full recovery of the loss or some sharing of
the costs of the write-off between the stockholders and the
customers of the utility.
6 3
Although not completely clear from the order, it appears the Commission
opted for the latter alternative. The Commission ruled that certain items be
excluded from any investments to be amortized and recovered from the Black
Fox project. These included Black Fox advertising expenses, public relations,
expenses, and any portion of the investment that could be converted for use
in conjunction with a coal-fired facility at the Inola site.,"
The Commission also held that P.S.O. should exercise due diligence in
securing the sale of equipment, materials, and supplies charged to the Black
Fox work order that could not be utilized elsewhere in P.S.O.'s operations.,5
The proceeds of such sales, as well as all extraordinary gains realized by the
company from 1974 to the date of the order, should be credited against the
equity portion of the initial balance of the recovery associated with the
project.
66
The Commission concluded:
63. Id. at 57, 58 (emphasis added).
64. Id. at 59.
65. Almost a year after the official cancellation of Black Fox, an Oklahoma newspaper eported
the sale of Black Fox equipment and hardware to be "slow and tedious." One of the reasons
reported for the sluggishness in the selling process was the lack of prospective buyers. Because
production of nuclear energy is a highly specialized industry, most equipment is custom built
for one location. Additionally, most of the equipment cannot be used for any purpose other
than the construction and operation of a nuclear power plant. In the meantime, 21 employees
are reportedly doing "erosion control work and routine maintenance" while keeping vigilance
over millions of dollars worth of unsold equipment at the Black Fox site. Sunday Oklahoman,
Jan. 30, 1983, at 12, col. 1.
66. P.S.O. Order, supra note 8, at 59.
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After deduction of these items from the Black Fox work order,
we believe Applicant should be allowed to amortize the initial
balance for recovery on a straight-line basis over a 10 year period,
subject to our further findings as stated below.
A substantial amount of testimony was presented to us with
respect to whether or not a return on the recovery portion during
amortization should be granted and, if so, how much return should
be allowed. We conclude, based upon the testimony presented to
us, that a full return would reward the equity owner unnecessari-
ly, while no return on this capital investment would tell bondholders
and preferred stockholders that they are not protected from risks
which are normally attributable to equity holders of a company.
We believe that capital recovery is essential to the financial health
of Public Service Company and it is imperative that the invest-
ment community retain confidence in this Company. Accordingly,
we find that the debt and preferred portion amortized loss
associated with a Black Fox recovery should carry their actual costs
as established in this case, but that no return be included in the
equity portion. Should it become necessary in subsequent rate cases
in order to maintain this Company's financial integrity and its
ability to attract capital at reasonable cost for the benefit of
Oklahoma ratepayers we will consider among other things a partial
return to the equity holder.
6 7
As previously stated, P.S.O. accepted the option given it by the Commission
and canceled the plans for the Black Fox nuclear project. On June 3, 1982,
the Oklahoma Corporation Ctmmission ruled that P.S.O. may begin re-
covering more than $158 million in losses from the cancellation of the project.6"
The order is designed to allow P.S.O. to recover $22,861,945 of the aggregate
amount during the first amortized year.69
As expected, this decision has generated great concern and controversy
among consumer groups and affected ratepayers. On February 16, 1982, the
State Attorney General filed a Petition in Error with the Oklahoma Supreme
Court seeking review of the Commission's order.7"
II. Rate Treatment of Costs Associated
With Canceled Generating Plants
A Brief Overview of Rate-making
Three major components make up a public regulatory commission's rate-
67. Id. at 55, 60 (emphasis added).
68. 10 ENERGY Usmas REP. (BNA) 564, 565 (June 10, 1982).
69. Id. at 565.
70. State ex rel. Cartwright v. Oklahoma Corp. Comm'n & Public Serv. Co. of Oklahoma
No. 58,123. The brief for the appellant was filed Jan. 7, 1983. Perhaps as a humorous aside
the appellant, requesting an extension of time within which to file his brief, stated as suppor
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making decision-rate base, rate of return, and operating expenses.' Calcula-
tion of rate base is a critical step in establishing maximum rates because it
represents the total investment in, or fair value of, the facilities employed
in providing a utility's service. That figure is multiplied by a percentage rate
of return to arrive at the allowed returns that orthodox regulations give a
utility an opportunity to earn.' 2 Regulatory commissions must also determine
the operating expenses a utility incurs to provide the regulated product, a
figure also allowed to be recovered from the ratepayer.
For most legislatures, agencies, and reviewing courts, the choice of method
for valuing the rate base is between original cost, reproduction cost, or some
combination of the two, referred to as "fair value." Approximately thirty-
eight states rely solely upon original cost as the basis for valuing a firm's rate
base. The remainder use the "fair value" method in which a balance is struck
between original cost and reproduction cost.73
Oklahoma is considered a "fair value" jurisdiction. In Oklahoma Natural
Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission,7 ' the Oklahoma Supreme Court ap-
proved the following fair value rule for determining a rate base:
In determining the present fair value of the property of a public
utility, neither original cost nor reproduction cost new, considered
separately, are determinative, but consideration should be given
to both original cost and present reproduction cost, less deprecia-
tion, together with all the other facts and circumstances which
would have a bearing upon the value of the property, and from
a consideration of all of these a fair present value is to be
determined.75
Regulatory commissions must also determine whether a certain expenditure
should be included as an operating expense so that a utility can recoup the
expenditure from its customers.7 6 This is often a source of considerable con-
thereof: "The attorney assigned to write this brief, unexpectedly and with minimal notice, ob-
tained employment and began working elsewhere." Motion of Oct. 12, 1982 (of record).
71. E. GELLHORN & R. PIERCE, JR., REGULATED INDusTuEs IN A NuTsHELL (1982) [hereinafter
cited as GELLHORN & PIERCE].
72. A. PRIEST, PRINCPLES OF PUBLIC UTILTY REGULATION 139 (1969) [hereinafter cited as
PR EST]. Confiscatory rates are those which do not afford a fair and reasonable return on the
property of the investment at the time it is used in public services. In Permian Basin Area Rate
Cases, 390 U.S. 747, 792 (1968), the United States Supreme Court established that a return is
fair and reasonable if it: covers utility operating expenses; debt service and dividends; compen-
sates investors for the risks of investment and is sufficient to attract capital; assures confidence
in the enterprise's financial integrity; and also provides protection to the existing and foreseeable
relevant public interests.
73. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 112.
74. 90 Okla. 84, 216 P. 917 (1923).
75. Id. at 85, 216 P. at 917. Accord: Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 648 P.2d
36 (Okla. 1982); Tecumseh Gas System, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d 356 (Okla. 1977); General Tel.
Co. of Southwest v. State, 484 P.2d 1304 (Okla. 1971); McAlester Gas & Coke Co. v. Corpora-
tion Comm'n, 102 Okla. 118, 227 P. 83 (1924).
76. PsRasT, supra note 72, at 47.
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troversy in economic regulation. Rates are determined prospectively and should
reflect the utility's future operating expenses. Because the future is difficult
to forecast, operating expenses traditionally have been determined based on
actual expenses incurred by the business firm in a recent period, often re-
ferred to as the "test year.""
The general standard for determining whether to allow an operating ex-
pense in the rates charged to consumers was stated in Missouri ex rel.
Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. Public Service Commission.7 ' The case
held that a public utility commission is not the financial manager of a cor-
poration and is not empowered to substitute its judgment for that of the direc-
tors of the corporation. Items charged by a utility as operating expenses are
to be recognized in the rate-making process unless there is an abuse of dis-
cretion by the corporate officers.79
According to Professors Gellhorn and Pierce, the "abuse of discretion"
basis for disallowing expenses encompasses two subsidiary standards.8 0 First,
an expense can be disallowed entirely if it was improperly inaurred in the
sense that it does not benefit the firm's customers. Second, an expense can
be disallowed in part if it is excessive in relation to the resulting benefit to
the firm's customers or in relation to the cost of alternative means of pro-
viding that benefit.8' Thus, inefficiency, improvidence, waste, or bad faith
on the part of management must be demonstrated or the regulator cannot
disregard reasonable and fair operating expenses incurred in the rendition of
service."
In sum, the primary role of the regulatory commission is to establish a
reasonable rate of return based upon the fair value of the public utility com-
pany's property in view of the needs of the company as well as the needs
of the consumer." The "reasonableness" of the rates the utility is permitted
to charge is a question of law.84 Therefore, whenever a company, or a con-
sumer asserts that the regulator has deviated from this standard, the question
involved becomes subject to judicial review.8 5
The Amortization Process
The traditional device for passing the expenses and risk of abandonment
losses to the ratepayer is to amortize the losses over a specific number of
years and to add the annual amortization amount to the cost of service. The
77. GELLUORN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 99.
78. 262 U.S. 276 (1923).
79. Id. at 289.
80. GELLAORN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 144.
81. Id.
82. West Ohio Gas Co. v. Public Util. Comm'n, 294 U.S. 63, 72 (1935).
83. M. FARMS & R. SAMPSON, PUBLIC UTILITEs: REGULATION, MANAGEMENT, AND OWNER-
sBm 64 (1973).
84. Note, Who Shall Bear the Cost of Abandonment, 11 CAP. U.L. REV. 91, 93 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as Note].
85. Id.
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unamortized balance may also be included in the rate base. If not, this amount
will have to be absorbed by the utility stockholders.
If the loss has produced a tax savings, the tax savings must also be amor-
tized over the same period and credited against the loss. To illustrate, sup-
pose that a utility has invested $100 million in a canceled project. As soon
as the project is abandoned, the utility experiences a loss of the amount of
investment. As a result of that loss, the utility also experiences a tax savings
of, say, $50 million. The utility must then employ two accounts that it amor-
tizes over the write-off period (usually five or ten years). From the abandon-
ment loss account, it adds $10 to $20 million a year to the cost of service;
from the associated tax savings account, it credits the cost of service with
an offsetting $5 to $10 million per year.86
An alternative device is the "net-of-tax" accounting method. Using this
approach, the tax savings is set off against the abandonment loss at the outset,
and the net loss is amortized over five years to the cost of service."
In either the gross-of-tax or the net-of-tax approach, the effect is gradually
to transfer from the equity holder to the ratepayer the loss on the project
and the associated tax benefit.88
Jurisdictional Treatment of Amortization
The overwhelming majority of state commissions that have entertained the
question of allocating the costs associated with abandonment of power plant
projects have allowed recovery through amortization.9 Of these, the majority
86. Bruder, supra note 1, at 171.
87. Id.
88. Id.
89. Five of the most recent decisions in which state regulatory commissions have dealt with
the cancellation amortization issue are: Commonwealth Elec. Co., 47 PuB. UTn. REP. 4th (PUR)
229 (1982), where the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities found a utility's investment
in the joint ownership of a nuclear project to be prudent, but the recovery was limited to the
point where "uncertainty had become intolerably high"; Boston Edison Co., 46 PuB. Urn. REP.
4th (PUR) 431 (1982), where the Massachusetts Department of Public Utilities allowed the amor-
tization of costs incurred from the cancellation of a nuclear power plant to be amortized over
a 13-year period, with the company earning a 14% carrying charge on the unrecovered balance.
The state regulatory commission utilized the following factors when determining the allocation
of the loss: (1) the prudence of the company's actions throughout the history of the project;
(2) the equity and fairness of any pioposed allocation; and (3) the necessity of adjusting the
financial impacts of any allocation to ensure the adequacy of future service; Rochester Gas &
Elec. Corp., 45 Pun. Urn. REP. 4th (PUR) 386 (1982), where the New York Public Service
Commission allowed rate recovery and amortization for both an abandoned fossil-fueled project
and a canceled nuclear project; Jersey Cent. Power Co., 44 Pun. Urm. REP. 4th (PUR) 54 (1981),
where an abandoned nuclear power plant loss was amortized over a 15-year period. The un-
amortized balance was not included in the rate base; Virginia Elec. & Power Co., 44 PUn. Urnt.
REP. 4th (PUR) 46 (1981), where the Virginia State Corporation Commission held that cancella-
tion losses associated with a nuclear power plant that was prudently planned initially, but later
abandoned, was a proper "cost of service" item. However, because the property is no longer
"used or useful" to the ratepayers, no unamortized losses should be included in the rate base.
For a list of thirty-four decisions in which the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC)
and various state public utility commissions have allowed recovery of abandonment losses from
ratepayers, see Bruder, supra note 1, at 185.
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have permitted an amortization process that permits the utility investor to
recover his investment in the canceled projects, but does not permit the in-
vestor to earn a return on his investment.90 This is considered to be a form
of "sharing" the abandonment losses. Therefore, it achieves a "satisfactory"
risk distribution between the stockholder and the ratepayer.
Only a few commissions have denied utility companies the right to recover
any of their losses incurred as a result of plant termination. In Arizona Public
Service Co.," the Arizona Corporation Commission denied recovery based
on its findings that the company had not adequately justified the expenses
claimed; that the expense was unusual and nonrecurring so that it would skew
test-year results; and that planning of the units is controlled by shareholders
as a function of management, and thus shareholders hould appropriately bear
any loss.
Several state commissions have disallowed amortization of cancellation costs
where the canceled facilities were planned for and the subsequent cancella-
tion was caused by other jurisdictions.92 A proposed nuclear plant (the Tyrone
Energy Park Project), owned by Northern States Power Company and its
subsidiary Northern States Power Company of Wisconsin, was terminated
in March 1979 pursuant to an order of the Wisconsin Public Service Com-
mission. Northern States Power and its subsidiary are subject to regulation
in five jurisdictions," each of which has treated the plant cancellation
differently." The Minnesota Public Utilities Commission held that the Min-
nesota ratepayers should not bear any of the cancellation costs because the
Wisconsin Commission had acted erroneously in requiring the project to be
terminated." The North Dakota Public Service Commission held that
ratepayers should not be required to pay any of the costs of Tyrone. However,
in In re Northern States Power Co.,96 the North Dakota Supreme Court
reversed the Commission's ruling and held that under the preemption doc-
trine the Commission was required to accept an FERC determination of rates.
90. There are few state commissions that have allowed utilities to recover cancellation costs
through amortization and inclusion of the unamortized balance in the rate base. Among the
states that have allowed rate base inclusion are Florida, Louisiana, New York, North Carolina,
and Wisconsin. Among those that deny rate base treatment of unamortized balances are Califor-
nia, New Jersey, Texas, and Virginia. Bruder, supra note 1, at 175.
91. Docket No. U-1345 (Ariz. Corp. Comm'n 1980).
92. Bruder, supra note 1, at 172.
93. The FERC and the states of Wisconsin, North Dakota, South Dakota, and Minnesota
all have jurisdictional power over the Tyrone Energy Park Project.
94. Annual Report, 1982 A.B.A. SEC. PUa. UrL. L. REP. 67 [hereinater cited as ABA, 1982
ANNUAL REPORT].
95. Northern States Power Co., 42 PuB. Urn. REP,. 4th (PUR) 339 (1981). The Minnesota
Commission,- in rejecting the amortization of the Tyrone loss, concluded that the cancellation
was of no benefit to Minnesota ratepayers, and that the owners of the two NSP companies
control their operations and assume the risks of ownership by investing. The Commission fur-
ther found that the expenses of the abandonment were not a reasonable expense to be included
in Minnesota retail rates, no matter in what form those expenses were presented.
96. 314 N.W.2d 32 (N.D. 1981). A 1981 FERC decision permitted NSP and its subsidiary
to amortize the costs of the Tyrone project over a 10-year period, but denied rate treatment
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Very few other state supreme courts have reviewed the cancellation amor-
tization situation, although it is expected that many will soon be faced with
this issue. In Gulf Power Co. v. Cresse," the Supreme Court of Florida af-
firmed a decision of the Public Service Commission allowing Gulf Power to
amortize the costs of its canceled Caryville generating plant and allowed in-
clusion of the unamortized balance in the rate base. The opinion did not discuss
the issue at length, stating only that the Commission "neither violated the
essential requirements of law nor abused its discretion by including the unamor-
tized Caryville cancellation charges as a rate base component."9
In Central Maine Power Co. v. Public Utilities Commission,99 the Maine
Supreme Judicial Court affirmed a Commission order that allowed the com-
pany to amortize the costs of a canceled nuclear plant over a five-year period,
but denied a return on the unamortized balance. The court held that this con-
stituted a reasonable balancing of the interests of the ratepayers and the
stockholders.'00
Perhaps the leading decision by a state's highest court on this question is
Office of Consumer's Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission."' The Ohio
court's decision was the first dispositive ruling by a state supreme court solely
addressing the propriety of allowing the utility to recoup any of the expen-
ditures related to the cancellation of such projects."2 Four nuclear power plants
were being constructed jointly by the Central Area Power Coordination Group,
consisting of Cleveland Electric Illuminating Company (C.E.I., the principal
litigant), Toledo Edison, Ohio Edison, and two Pennsylvania utilities, Du-
quesne Light Company and Pennsylvania Power Company."13 The appeal in-
volved Cleveland Electric's approximately $56 million, which was invested in
the four plants as of the date of termination. The Ohio Public Utility Com-
mission had found that the decision to construct the plant in 1973, and the
later decision to terminate construction in 1980, were "reasonable and pru-
dent." In line with authority in other states, the Commission allowed a ten-
year amortization, noting that C.E.I. had not requested any return on the
unamortized investment."' In reversing the orders of the Commission, the
Ohio Supreme Court held that the Commission was without authority to allow
the recovery through rates of any of the investment. The court specifically
relied upon an Ohio statute that permitted recognition as operating expenses
for rate-making purposes only "the normal recurring expenses incurred by
of the unamortized balance. The FERC reasoned that this treatment would allocate the losses
equitably between shareholders and stockholders. Federal Energy Regulatory Commission Docket
No. ER-79-616, Op. No. 134 (Dec. 1981); Urm. L. Rm. (Federal) (CCH) 12,516 (Dec. 3, 1981).
97. 410 So. 2d 492 (Fla. 1982).
98. ABA, 1982 ANNuAL REPoRT, supra note 94, at 68.
99. 433 A.2d 331 (Me. 1981).
100. Id. See ABA, 1982 ANIuAL REPORT, supra note 94, at 69.
101. 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d 820 (1981), app. disniissed 102 S. Ct. 1267 (1982).
102. Note, supra note 84, at 94.
103. ABA, 1982 ANuAL REPoRT, supra note 94, at 65.
104. Id.
NOi-ES1983]
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utilities in the course of rendering service to the public for the test period."15
Therefore, the court held that an abandonment loss is not an operating ex-
pense, notwithstanding the overwhelming weight of authority from other
jurisdictions. With respect to the policy argument that such a decision would
seriously disadvantage Ohio utilities in capital markets, the court said this
was a legislative matter.'06
The United States Supreme Court refused to review the Ohio Supreme
Court's decision,10 7 dismissing C.E.I.'s appeal "for want of a properly
presented federal question."'0 8
III. Policy Arguments
One utility spokesman has recently stated that the situation facing the par-
ticipating utilities and their ratepayers has the potenial of "a horror story."'0 9
Few could disagree that it would at first seem only fair that the investor alone
should bear the cost of cancellation of a utility facility; common business
practice places the risk of loss on the investors. Factors unique to the utility
and energy industries, however, require an examination of the propriety of
doing so here. Although no current reference dealing exclusively with the policy
arguments of the cancellation/capital recovery issue exists, a summary of the
competing arguments is illuminating.
The utilities can assert that it is fair and reasonable to recover the cost
of investments in canceled power-generation projects through a rate-making
scheme because the initial investment was made for the benefit of the
customers, as was the decision to cancel."10
Another argument for the inclusion of amortization costs in the rates charged
to consumers is that the cash return would help restore the financial integrity
of the utility industry, enhancing the industry's ability to build additional plants
and equipment as it becomes necessary. A 1982 report prepared for the Reagan
administration called for major changes in utility regulation and rate-making
to put the industry on sound financial footing and encourage investments in
long-term capacity."' The report blamed adverse economic conditions and
105. 67 Ohio St. 153, 423 N.E.2d 820, 827 (1981). See Omo REV. CODE AN. § 4909.15(A)(4)
(Page 1980).
106. 67 Ohio St. 153, 423 N.E.2d 820, 829 (1981). See ABA, 1982 ANNUAL REPORT, supra
note 94, at 65. On the day following the Ohio Supreme Court decision, Moody's reduced the
rating of C.E.I. bonds from Aa to A.
107. 102 S. Ct. 1267 (1982).
108. Id. The Supreme Court noted that a state court ruling may be reviewed in the United
States Supreme Court only if a question of federal law is involved. In the statement accompany-
ing its appeal, C.E.I. contended the state court's decision amounted to a taking of its property
without just -compensation in violation of the fifth and fourteenth amendments to the United
States Constitution. However, according to the briefs urging dismissal of the appeal, the com-
pany waited too long to raise its federal constitutional claims. See 10 ENEaG UsEs RaP. (BNA)
96 (Jan. 28, 1982).
109. 10 ENERGY UsRs REP. (BNA) 1043 (Oct. 14, 1982).
110. 9 ENERGY UsEns REP. (BNA) 1836 (Dec. 31, 1981).
111. See 10 ENERGr UsEas REP. (BNA) 1079, 1080 (Oct. 28, 1982).
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inadequate rate relief for the deteriorating health of the utility industry. Public
utility commissions have provided significantly less rate base relief than utilities
have requested, and this has contributed to the industry's failure to earn its
allowed return, the report said.'
2
The poor financial posture of utilities is reflected in low interest coverage
ratios and return on equity, downgraded bond ratings, and stock selling below
book value, the report continued. These financial woes have constrained
utilities' access to capital markets, jeopardizing their ability to meet growing
capacity requirements."
3
If utilities cannot cure their financial difficulties, they will continue to scale
back construction programs, resulting in less reliable service and long-term
increases in electricity rates. The report concluded that nuclear- and coal-
powered facilities, which represent more than 90% of the generating plants
either planned or under construction, will be deferred or canceled.",
Finally, the utilities assert that failure to pass on the costs and expenses
of these projects could result in the utilities' bankruptcy (as was noted by
the Oklahoma Corporation Commission in the Black Fox order). Inclusion
of the abandonment costs is a necessary expense for the maintenance of
adequate service at the lowest reasonable cost to the consuming public.
Opponents of the inclusion of these costs could have several counter-
arguments. First, the consumers had no real voice in the decision-making pro-
cess. Although the consumers recognize the utilities' legal duty to provide
service and to forecast needs for the future benefit of their customers, the
fact remains that the utilities also share in the benefits of their endeavors
by the profits they soon realize.
Second, the financial difficulties of the utility industry (which are subject
to question in themselves) are not unique. A generally unfavorable economic
state is fairly universal. By passing on the losses through a rate-making scheme,
the economic burden is merely shifted to members of the lower economic
groups, many of whom find it difficult to pay their utility bills at the current
rates.
Third, bankruptcy is neither a valid nor a realistic option. The federal
government and American society as a whole could not allow the producer
of such a valuable commodity as electricity to become insolvent. As an exam-
ple, General Public Utilities, owners of the Three Mile Island nuclear project,
have continued to exist and are presently showing steady improvement after
the Three Mile Island accident."'
Allowing total or partial recovery may encourage the utility industry to fur-
ther delay examining least-cost and renewable alternatives such as solar power,
wind power, and conservation. This would sink the industry deeper into the
112. Id.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. This conclusion is based upon information found in the General Public Utilities Cor-
poration's 1980 and 1981 Annual Reports. This is also evidenced by a substantial climb in value
in GPU's common stock since the Three Mile Island .incident.
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same pattern of poor investments that has accounted for the present situa-
tion. In addition, if utilities and their investors can feel relatively confident
in their ability to recover this type of investment (barring a difficult showing
of imprudence or unreasonableness), this would create incentives to build costly
and unnecessary projects without fully considering the lower-cost alternatives.
Finally, if the consumers, rather than the shareholders, bear the burden
of poor planning or unforseeable circumstances, it would destroy manage-
ment accountability. The credibility of, and confidence in, the utilities,
regulatory agencies, and even the reviewing courts would be substantially
diminished.
It is questionable whether any satisfactory alternatives could be developed.
Government subsidies in the form of low-interest or no-interest loans may
provide an agreeable resolution. However, uncertainty exists as to the likelihood
of such action, especially in light of the current administration's budgetary
endeavors.
IV. Legal Issues Before the Supreme Court of Oklahoma
The Oklahoma Supreme Court is facing a true judicial dilemma in the Black
Fox controversy."6 The court must deal with its traditional policy of deference
to the rate-making decisions of the Corporation Commission (absent a clear
abuse of its discretionary power), and it must confront a vehement public
seeking equitable application of the law. Moreover, the court must adjudicate
the extraordinary controversy with little or no precedent.
Oklahoma Corporation Commission's
Statutory and Constitutional Powers
Gas, electric, telephone, and water utilities are regulated by the Corpora-
tion Commission, as provided by the Oklahoma constitution and the Oklahoma
Statutes.'I The supervision of public utilities includes the power to establish
rates."8 The power of the Commission to promulgate rates has been described
as a legislative power,"19 and under such authority the Commission may
establish rates that the state otherwise could prescribe had it not delegated
that power to the Commission.2
Oklahoma's legislature has given the Corporation Commission substantial
discretionary powers to be used iri the performance of its duties. Title 17,
section 152, of the Oklahoma Statutes is the primary statutory source for
the Commission's jurisdiction over public utilities:
116. The Oklahoma constitution art. 9, § 20 provides in part: "An appeal from an order
of the Corporation Commission affecting the rates, charges, services, practices, rules or regula-
tions of public utilities or public service corporations, shall be to the Supreme Court only. .. ."
117. OaA. CONST. art. IX; 17 OKLA. STAT. §§ 151-52 (1981). See also Annual Survey of
Oklahoma Law, 2 OKLA. CrrY U.L. REv. 53 (1977).
118. OK",. CONST. art. 9, § 18; 17 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (1981).
119. Fort Smith & W. Ry. v. State, 25 Okla. 866, 108 P. 407 (1910).
120. Guthrie Gas, Light, Fuel & Improvement Co. v. Board of Educ., 64 Okla. 157, 166
P. 128 (1917).
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The Commission shall have general supervision over all public
utilities, with power to fix and establish rates and to prescribe rules,
requirements and regulations, affecting their services, operation and
the management and conduct of their business; shall inquire into
the management of the business thereof, and the method in which
same is conducted ... 1
Thus, there is little specificity in the mandates for rate-making procedures
and policies of the Corporation Commission. What has developed from this
is a frequently changing "state of the law" based on case law. This process
has given liberality to the Commission and, in turn, an important niche for
the supreme court to fill in controlling the administrative agency's power.
Scope of Judicial Review
Article IX, section 20, of the Oklahoma constitution provides in pertinent
part:
The Supreme Court's review of appealable orders of the Cor-
poration Commission shall be judicial only, and in all appeals in-
volving an asserted violation of any right of the parties under the
Constitution of the United States or the Constitution of the State
of Oklahoma, the court shall exercise its own independent judg-
ment as to both the lav and the facts. In all other appeals from
the orders of the Corporation Commission the review by the
Supreme Court shall not extend further than to determine whether
the Commission has regularly pursued its authority, and whether
the findings and conclusions of the Commission are sustained by
the law and substantial evidence. Upon review, the Supreme Court
shall enter judgment, either affirming or reversing the order of the
Commission appealed from.
A 1982 Oklahoma Supreme Court decision is particularly important in deter-
mining the court's current standards of judicial review of the Commission.
In Teleco v. Corporation Commission,'22 the Corporation Commission
authorized a credit rate considerably less than that requested by Southwestern
Bell. In affirming, the court found the Commission's order "supported by
substantial evidence viewed in its totality."123 Justice Opala, speaking for the
court, set fourth the current standard of review:
In reviewing Commission orders this court is required to deter-
mine if the order is sustained by law and supported by substantial
evidence. An appeal here is for judicial review only, and this court
is required to exercise its own independent judgment as to both
lav and facts. The determination of whether there is substantial
121. 1913 Okla. Sess. Laws ch. 93, § 2.
122. 653 P.2d 209 (Okla. 1982).
123. Id. at 212.
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evidence in support of the Commission's findings does not require
that the evidence be weighed, but only that the totality of the record
be examined and proof found to be "more than a mere scintilla".
The evidence should be found to possess something of substance
and of relevant consequence-something that carries with it fitness
to induce conviction. There is a presumption of correctness that
accompanies the findings of the Commission in matters it frequently
adjudicates and in which it possesses expertise. In the performance
of its duties the Commission has wide discretion and this Court
may not substitute its judgment on disputed questions of fact unless
the findings are contrary to law or unsupported by substantial
evidence.2"
In this same opinion, the court specifically stated: "We adopted in El Paso
Natural Gas v. Corporation Commission, the so-called totality-of-evidence
standard for our review of Corporation Commission decisions. Federal
Supreme Court jurisprudence is entirely consistent with our view. Universal
Camera Corporation v. National Labor Relations Board." [Citations omitted.J
121
It appears the Oklahoma Supreme Court has recently commenced a more
intensive examination of Corporation Commission practices. In El Paso
Natural Gas, as well as the subsequent decision of Cartwright v. Oklahoma
Natural Gas Co.,'26 the court alluded to its responsibility to review the Cor-
poration Commission's findings and conclusions by examining the "whole
of evidence found in record including such evidence which fairly detracts from
the weight thereof.'
'
1
27
In determining the appropriate standard of review for the Black Fox decision,
one must first look to the basis of the arguments raised on appeal. If the
appellant raises a constitutional issue, the supreme court must exercise its own
independent judgment as to both the law and the facts. This would seem to
be advantageous to the Attorney General's case in that it provides a max-
imum degree of amenability. By the court's ability to substitute its judgment,
the scope of review is, in effect, unlimited.
If the appeal is not based on an asserted constitutional violation, the court
uses a three-tiered scope of review. First, the court must determine if the Com-
mission exceeded its authority. Second, the court must adjudge whether the
findings and conclusions by the Commission are contrary to the prevailing
law. Third, the substantial evidence test is applied to the findings and conclu-
sions of the Commission in reviewing the questions of fact. This includes the
application of the newly adopted totality-of-evidence standard. If the supreme
124. Id. For recent decisions supporting this interpretation, see Lone Star Gas Co. v. Cor-
poration Comm'n, 648 P.2d 36 (Okla. 1982); Tecumseh Gas System, Inc. v. State, 565 P.2d
356 (Okla. 1977); Bishop v. Corporation Comm'n, 394 P.2d 235 (Okla. 1964).
125. 653 P.2d 209, 212 (Okla. 1982).
126. 640 P.2d 1341 (Okla. 1982).
127. Id.
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court finds that the Commission erred in any of the three tiers, the order
must be reversed.
An argument could be made that there be no "presumption of correct-
ness" in the Black Fox case, based on the language of Teleco. Because of
the extraordinary and unusual nature of power plant cancellations, the Black
Fox situation is not a matter the Commission frequently adjudicates. Never-
theless, it appears the court is in a position to defer to the Commission's
findings in the Black Fox order, recognizing the Commission's wide discre-
tion in the performance of its duties.
Potential Legal Arguments by Appellant
The appellant (Attorney General of Oklahoma) could have a difficult time
combating statutory omissions, the potential deference of the court, and lack
of precedent. However, upon closer scrutiny, a successful cause of action may
lie. The following is a brief survey of potential legal arguments which could
be invoked.
1. Prudence. The overriding concern in the majority of previous cases,
at both the Commission and the appellate levels, is whether the utility acted
reasonably and prudently. This inquiry concerns both the implementation and
the termination of the project. As stated previously, the facts pertinent to
such an inquiry are those in existence at the time each of the foregoing decisions
was made."8 The Oklahoma Corporation Commission found that P.S.O. did
not act imprudently in its actions with the Black Fox project. Considering
the ever-increasing costs resulting from delays, the additional regulatory
requirements, and the continued uncertainty surrounding nuclear power in
general, it would seem improbable for the appellant to meet the stringent
burden of proof that would overturn the Commission's judgment. It is,
however, a logical point at which to begin. In addition, one might argue that
the "reasonable and prudent" standard is not the sole criterion for determining
whether a utility is entitled to capital recovery of a loss.'
29
2. Unconstitutional Confiscation. An unconstitutional confiscation issue
might possibly be raised.'3 ' The fifth amendment o the Constitution of the
United States provides that "no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property without due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for
public use without just compensation."'3' Together with the fourteenth amend-
ment, these constitutional provisions recognize that there may be confisca-
tion in rate regulation.12 In the past, the issue has been raised almost ex-
clusively with respect to the taking or deprivation of the utility's property.
128. Note, supra note 84, at 95.
129. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Public Util. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St. 2d 153, 423 N.E.2d
820 (1981), app. dismissed 102 S. Ct. 1267 (1982).
130. The burden of proving rates fixed by the Corporation Commission to be confiscatory
is upon the party complaining. Southwestern Pub. Serv. Co. v. State, 637 P.2d 92 (Okla. 1981).
131. U.S. CoNsT. amend. V.
132. E. NICHOLS, RULING PRICIPLES OF UTILITY REGULATION 10 (1955).
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By analogy, would not an increase in rates without a concurrent benefit, as
a result of an amortization authorized by the public regulatory body, con-
stitute a "taking" of the consumer's property? It has interesting due process
of law violation possibilities. Although a search through case law, commen-
taries, and legal journals reveals no discussion on this subject, the appellant
could succeed in requiring the Oklahoma Supreme Court to use its own deter-
mination of the facts and issues on appeal by challenging on constitutional
grounds.'
33
3. "Used and Useful." Not every asset owned by a regulated firm is in-
cluded in its rate base. Traditionally, there are two tests for including an asset
in the rate base. First, was the firm's decision to invest in the asset "pru-
dent"? Second, is the asset "used and useful" to the firm in making available
the regulated product? Each test has several applications, and sometimes the
two overlap.
3
The "used and useful" argument has substantial merit in this case. Because
the Black Fox nuclear project was terminated in the planning and preconstruc-
tion stage, it never has been and never will be operational.'31 If it is not used
and useful property, it could be concluded that the expenditures associated
with the project should be absorbed by the owners and not by the ratepayers.
The Three Mile Island mishap in March of 1979 provides a strong model
for the used and useful rationale. The Pennsylvania Public Utilities Commis-
sion held that Unit One (the undamaged and operable reactor) could not be
included in the rate base because it was not used or useful.'36 This decision
is particularly persuasive in that Unit One was excluded despite the fact it
was once "used" and may one day resume ''usefulness." The Black Fox
nuclear facility has never produced a kilowatt of electricity, and it never will.
There is federal precedent for this contention. In Denver Stock Yard Co.
v. United States, 1 7 the United States Supreme Court held the appellant
stockyard operator was "not entitled to have included [in the rate base] any
property not used and useful." Other cases have similar language.'3
Oklahoma has also addressed the issue. The supreme court, in Southwestern
Public Service Co. v. State, 139 has recently held:
In the case of Oklahoma Natural Gas Co. v. Corporation Com-
mission, this court said: "in determining whether the rate is
reasonable, it is necessary to ascertain the fair value of the prop-
133. OKLA. CONsT. art. 9, § 20.
134. Gr.woaRN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 116.
135. A more complex question would arise if the abandoned project is converted into a coal-
fired generating facility, as discussed previously. However, much of the-equipment, supplies,
etc., can only be used in the operations of a nuclear facility.
136. Pennsylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n v. Metropolitan Edison Co., Uam. L. REP. (State) (CCH)
23,117 (Pa. Pub. Util. Comm'n, May 23, 1980), at pp. 53,318-53,321.
137. 304 U.S. 470, 475 (1938).
138. See United Gas Pub. Service Co. v. Texas, 303 U.S. 123 (1937); St. Joseph Stock yards
Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
139. 637 P.2d 92, 97 (Okla. 1981).
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erty of the appellant used and useful in its public service business
at the time the inquiry was made, for appellant is entitled to a
rate which will yield a fair return upon the reasonable value of
the property at the time it is being used for the public."'
40
The court also noted:
Only the cost of those capital assets which are in actual use during
the test year, or whose use is so imminent and certain that they
may be said, at least by analogy, to have the quality of working
capital may be added to the rate base established by the test year
in any event; and then only if appropriate counter-balancing safe
guards are applied.'
The Oklahoma Supreme Court, if it desires, can justifiably rely on a strict
construction of the case law in this area. By so doing, the findings and con-
clusions of the Commission would not be sustained by the law and the order
would be reversed. Despite the reasons for allowing the capital recovery of
Black Fox, the result must not be contrary to the law, as required by the
constitutionally mandated judicial review. In addition, the court will avoid
violating a basic principle of fairness in the regulatory arena: a ratepayer should
pay only for facilities used and useful.' 2
4. Sole Decision of Management. One can assert that the law requires
the owners of the utility to bear the losses from an abandoned plant as a
function of management. The Ohio Supreme Court has stated:
It would be inequitable to prematurely shift the risk of plant failure
from the utility investors to the ratepayers. . . . The initial risk
of failure is appropriately borne by the investors, who have under-
taken the project.... It is only proper that their venture be found
operational before they commence to recoup their capital outlays
from consumers.43
When state commissions have considered the abandonment cost issue, the
foreseeability of the loss has been a relevant factor. Investors have a right
140. Id., citing 90 Okla. 84, 216 P.2d 917 (1923).
141. 637 P.2d 92, 98 (Okla. 1981) (emphasis added).
142. If the Oklahoma Supreme Court should reverse, P.S.O. might argue that the decision
deprives the company of its property without due process of law, contrary to the fifth and four-
teenth amendments. However, in Market St. Ry. v. Railroad Comm'n of California, 324 U.S.
548, 567 (1945), the United States Supreme Court stated:
[I]t may be safely generalized that the due process clause never has been held by
this court to require a commission to fix rates ... on an investment after it has
vanished, even if once prudently made.... The due process clause has been ap-
plied to prevent governmental destruction of existing economic values. It has not
and cannot be applied to insure values or to restore values that have been lost
by the operation of economic forces.
143. Consumers' Council v. Public Util. Comm'n, 58 Ohio St. 2d 449, 456, 391 N.E.2d 311,
315 (1979).
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to receive compensation for assuming the risks of doing business. The un-
foreseen cancellation of electric generating plants is undoubtedly a risk of
doing business of the utility field. In the event that investors have been
remunerated to take such risks (usually through an adequate rate of return),
it would only seem appropriate they should bear the loss.'4
In Oklahoma, there are no direct citations to this point. However, another
line of analysis may lead to the same conclusion.
In Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission,'" the supreme court
specifically held: "[T]he powers of the Commission are to regulate, super-
vise, and control the public service companies in their services and rates, but
these powers do not extend to an invasion of the discretion vested in the cor-
porate management."'4 6 The court went further and noted: "What the com-
pany does with its income is no concern of the ratemaking body . . . ,.
In Fred Harvey v. Corporation Commission,'"4 the court stated:
It must be remembered that, while much power is given to the Cor-
poration Commission in the regulation of public utilities, yet the
utility is not the property of the Commission or the state, but
belongs to the company and its stockholders, and the officers and
directors by them selected must, under proper regulation, be per-
mitted to manage the property in such proper way as to earn and
pay, if they lawfully can, just dividends to the stockholders. Regula-
tion must not be so far extended as to constitute management or
operation."1
9
Since the administrative agency is precluded from invading the discretionary
powers of a utility, it should logically flow that the citizens should not be
required to pay for an ill-fated decision over which they had no control.'0
The owners of the Black Fox project are totally free to direct management
in the selection of types, sizes and location of the facilities in which those
owners have chosen to invest. These same owners solely control their com-
panies and should therefore assume the risks of ownership through invest-
ment. Oklahoma ratepayers cannot be asked to insulate the owners from all
financial risk.
5. Absence of Required Findings. The court may be able to reverse the
Commission's decision on procedural grounds. The Corporation Commission's
144. Note, supra note 84, at 102. For an excellent discussion on risk of loss, see Note, Alloca-
tion of the Risk of Constructing Electric Power Plants, 1976 WASH. U. L.Q. 517.
145. 170 Okla. 292, 39 P.2d 547, 553 (1934). Accord, State v. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co.,
536 P.2d 887 (Okla. 1975).
146. 170 Okla. 292, 297, 39 P.2d 547, 553 (1934) (emphasis added).
147. Id. at 298, 39 P.2d at 554.
148. 102 Okla. 226, 229 P. 428 (1924).
149. Id. at 269, 229 P. at 431.
150. Although the Corporation Commission has authority over rate-making, it does not have
authority to require Oklahoma electric utilities to obtain approval prior to constructing a power
plant. Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n, 542 P.2d 546 (Okla. 1975). This
situation is discussed later in this paper.
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order on the Black Fox cancellation seemed peculiar in that nowhere in the
text of the phase three discussion did the Commission cite to any specific
case, statute, or other legal theory as precedent. The Commission also did
not present any quantitative evidence of studies to support its lengthy discus-
sion of P.S.O.'s potential bankruptcy, though this was a determinative factor
in the Commission's decision. The Oklahoma Corporation Commission thus
made it clear that its decision was based upon discretionary risk allocation,
not legal principle.
The Oklahoma Supreme Court emphasized the importance of compliance
with "fundamental" administrative procedure in Southwestern Public Ser-
vice Co. v. State.5' Although the court conceded that the Corporation Com-
mission is not subject to the Administrative Procedures Act of 1963,52 the
court emphasized the "illuminating" effect of previous decisions of the court
regarding administrative agency procedure. By analogy, the court found per-
suasive various excerpts from the existing case law. The court took specific
notice of the language in Brown v. Banking Board,53 which emphasized the
necessity for an administrative agency to make "findings of fact and conclu-
sions of law." This case noted that if the administrative agency failed to supply
such findings, its determinations would not be sustained.54 The court also
held that an agency's findings should be sufficient to apprise the parties and,
if necessary, the supreme court of the actual basis for the agency's actions.
This would allow the reviewing court to apply the substantial evidence test
151. 637 P.2d 92, 101 (Okla. 1981).
152. 75 OKaA. STAT. § 301 (1981). the Commission is, however, subject to § 304(a) of the
Act, relative to the filing of Commission rules. Part of the Oklahoma Administrative Procedures
Act, 75 OKLA. STAT. § 322 (1981), provides in part:
Setting aside, modifying or reversing of orders-Remand-Affirmance
[1] In any proceeding for the review of an agency order, the Supreme Court
or the district court, as the case may be, in the exercise of proper judicial discretion
or authority, may set aside or modify the order, or reverse it and remand it to
the agency for further proceedings, if it determines that the substantial rights of
the appellant or petitioner for review have been prejudiced because the agency find-
ings, inferences, conclusions or decisions, are:
(a) in violation of constitutional provisions; or
(b) in excess of the statutory authority or jurisdiction of the agency; or
(c) made upon unlawful procedure; or
(d) affected by other error of law; or
(e) clearly erroneous in view of the reliable, material, probative and substantial
competent evidence, as defined in Section 10 of this act, including matters properly
noticed by the agency upon examination and consideration of the entire record
as submitted; but without otherwise substituting judgment as to the weight of the
evidence for that of the agency on question of fact; or
(f) arbitrary or capricious; or
(g) because findings of fact, upon issues essential to the decision were not made
although requested.
153. 512 P.2d 166 (Okla. 1973), citing Allied Inv. Co. v. Oklahoma Sec. Comm'n, 451 P.2d
952 (Okla. 1969).
154. 512 P.2d 166, 168 (Okla. 1973). See also Lone Star Gas Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
648 P.2d 36, 39 (Okla. 1982).
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as well as to ensure against arbitrariness. Finally, the court stated: "Findings
in general terms are not sufficient.'
' 55
It could be argued that the Corporation Commission's findings were too
general in the Black Fox order. Though the Commission did make findings,
it is questionable whether the Commission's findings were facts or conclu-
sions. Further, it is debatable whether P.S.O.'s inevitable bankruptcy, of which
the Commission took judicial notice, would actually result if capital recovery
were denied. This is particularly true when considered in conjunction with
the appropriate materials in the policy arguments section of this paper.
In Sinclair Oil & Gas Co. v. Corporation Commission,'6 the Oklahoma
Supreme Court permitted the deletion of many of the considerations support-
ing the findings announced, when it would have been impracticable and would
have added nothing to the order. Although it would be burdensome, addi-
tional documentation would have enhanced reconciliation of the Commission's
reasoning for the Black Fox order.
Finally, the court in Southwestern Public Service" 7 repeated the purpose
of requiring findings of fact as alluded to in Brown'" and as reiterated
frequently. 5 9
Findings of [an] administrative agency acting in a quasi-judicial
capacity should be a recitation of basic or underlying facts drawn
from the evidence, and must be free from ambiguity which raises
doubt as to whether [the] board proceeded upon correct legal
theory, and must be sufficiently stated to enable [the] reviewing
court to intelligently review [the] order and ascertain if [the] facts
upon which [the] order is based afford [a] reasonable basis for
[the] order. 60
The form and content of the, Commission's order on Black Fox is not free
from ambiguity and there is certainly doubt as to the legal theory (if any) upon
which the Commission proceeded. A remand to the Commission for more
specific and detailed findings would not be inappropriate.
6. Precedent Set by the Ohio Supreme Court. As discussed earlier, the
Ohio Supreme Court's review of the abandonment issue in Office of Con-
sumers' Counsel6' was the first supreme court review of any state jurisdic-
tion. A student note in the Capital University Law Review perhaps best sum-
marizes this decision's effect:
Consumers' Counsel stands as an important precedent because
155. 512 P.2d 166, 168 (Okla. 1973).
156. 378 P.2d 847 (Okla. 1963).
157. Southwestern Public Serv. Co. v. State, 637 P.2d 92, 101 (Okla. 1981).
158. Brown v. Banking Bd., 512 P.2d 166 (Okla. 1973).
159. See State v. Guardian Funeral Home, 429 P.2d 732 (Okla. 1967); Oklahoma Inspection
Bureau v. Board of Prop. & Cas. Rates, 406 P.2d 543 (Okla. 1965).
160. Southwestern Public Serv. Co. v. State, 637 P.2d 92, 101 (Okla. 1981).
161. Office of Consumers' Counsel v. Pub. Util. Comm'n, 67 Ohio St.2d 153, 423 N.E.2d
820 (1981).
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it represents the first opinion on the issue by such a high court
and because it recognizes that investment risks are inherent in the
utility business .... Each of the commissions which will confront
this problem in the future must carefully consider the entire scope
of the issue, inclusive of all possible ramifications. . . . The
reasonable and prudent standard is not the end point for utility
regulators in all states. In addition, it should not be the sole
criterion. As is demonstrated by the Consumers' Counsel case, a
state may have common law as well as statutory delineations of
the proper course of inquiry which its commission has the legal
duty to follow. In Ohio, the supreme court's decision has not only
clarified the state's public utility statutes and common law but has
also set the proper standard for the commission in future abandon-
ment proceedings. Further, the high court's decision has set a na-
tional legal precedent.6 '
The Oklahoma Supreme Court should take special cognizance of Consumer's
Counsel during this period of legal uncertainty. The Ohio Supreme Court
prefaced its opinion by referring to several significant factors. The court first
noted that the Ohio Commission's decision was in accord with the weight
of authority from other jurisdictions, though these decisions were only at the
commission level in each jurisdiction. It also emphasized that none of the
commissions' decisions cited as support were decided with reference to Ohio
law. Finally, the court firmly established that the aforementioned administrative
decisions represented "advisory opinions, rather than precedent, which did
not bind the court in its role as the ultimate judge of what is the law in
Ohio."1
63
The Ohio court's judicial boldness would be welcomed by the utility
ratepayer in Oklahoma. In overturning the Ohio Commission's decision to
allow amortization of terminated project expenses, the Ohio Supreme Court
relied on its interpretation of state law. The Oklahoma Supreme Court should
do likewise and take full benefit of an opportunity to clarify the state's public
utility law. If for no other reason, the citizens of this state could place more
confidence in nine justices who base their judgments on equitable and legal
principles, than they could on three individuals who are unfamiliar with judicial
precedent and perhaps more subject to political influences. The courts are better
insulated from lobbying pressures that give strong advantages to industrial
concerns when they face administrative review of their operations.
V. Necessity for Statutory Reform
The major barrier to applying Consumers' Counsel in Oklahoma is the con-
siderable difference between Oklahoma and Ohio law. Specifically, there are
162. Note, supra note 84, at 108. This outstanding note was the only previous law review
publication dealing exclusively with capital recovery of abandoned power projects.
163. Id. at 105.
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few similarities between Oklahoma's and Ohio's statutory rate-making schemes.
This may not be a result of discordant philosophies of the two respective
legislatures. It is more likely the result of Ohio's detailed mandates of Com-
mission power as opposed to Oklahoma's broad and minimal provisions with
respect to public utilities. Only a few states delineate with specificity the stan-
dards by which their commissions are to fix rates and generally function.'"
The corresponding Oklahoma provision'5 is not a member of this group.
In fact, the legislative mandate with respect to the Corporation Commission's
supervisory and rate-making powers over public utilities"' may be as "general"
as that of any jurisdiction, if not more. For example, nearly every state's
statutory scheme demands that the rates its respective commission determines
shall be "just and reasonable."'167 This is a general provision used frequently
in rate-making procedures. Oklahoma's statutory scheme does not even in-
clude this provision as a basis for Commission authority. Most important,
there is a lack of specific guidelines to the Oklahoma Corporation Commis-
sion for its determination of rate base, rate of return, and operating expenses,
to name a few.
The Black Fox situation has made it strikingly clear: there is a pressing
need for statutory reform of Oklahoma's administrative process. If it were
possible, the Black Fox controversy might be most appropriately resolved by
a "remand" to the legislature. The legislature should give the courts, the Com-
mission, the utilities, and the public the benefit of its expressed intent. In
so doing, the legislature can help strike a more reasonable balance between
allowing the Commission its necessary "administrative expertise" and assur-
ing the citizens of this state that the "voice of the people" is controlling our
administrative functions, not a handful of decision-makers.
Exclusion of Property Not "Used or Useful"
The question of who shall pay for the costs of the cancellation of the Black
Fox nuclear project has placed the court, the Commission, and the utilities
in the public eye. This should be a legislative determination, not a judicial
one (assuming the legislature does not intend to delegate all of its authority
concerning regulatory matters to the Commission). The legislature is the ap-
propriate governmental body to determine who shall bear the costs of
abandonment.
The supreme court will be faced with the difficult task of ascertaining
legislative intent when it reviews the Black Fox situation. This will be par-
ticularly arduous considering that the drafters of the relevant statute prob-
ably could not have foreseen the bizarre circumstances and large amounts
of money involved in this situation. Did they intend to give "general supervi-
sion" to the Commission in a matter such as this?
164. Id. at 95 n.24. The footnote lists Illinois, Minnesota, Michigan, North Carolina, and
Ohio as states with detailed rate-making statutes. Today, Oregon should be included.
165. 17 OKLmA. STAT. §§ 151-61 (1981).
166. 17 OKLA. STAT. § 152 (1981).
167. Note, supra note 84, at 96.
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The legislature should move quickly to relieve the burden it has placed on
the court. As stated in the Oklahoma case of Johnson v. Ward: "When the
intent of the legislature is plainly expressed, there is no room for construc-
tion.",8
Concerning the specific question raised by the Black Fox crisis, it is sub-
mitted that it is inequitable to force the ratepayer to pay for services that
were never rendered and over which the public had no decision-making power.
A means to reach this objective could be to amend the applicable statute to
exclude property "not presently used or useful" from the rate base.
The Oregon legislature has encountered difficulties similar to the one faced
in Oklahoma. In Oregon, however, the legislature moved quickly. In 1979
that state legislature provided that:
No public utility shall, directly or indirectly, by any device, charge,
demand, collect or receive from any customer rates which are
derived from a rate base which includes within it any construc-
tion, building, installation or real or personal property not presently
used for providing utility service to the customer.'
6 9
Notice especially the provision for prohibition of indirect recovery. This would
effectively preclude a utility from increasing rates through alternate mechan-
isms.
The Oregor statute has been effectively implemented. Even the Oregon
Public Utility Commission has had little trouble in ascertaining legislative in-
tent. In In re Pacific Power & Light Co.,7 ' the Oregon Public Utility Com-
missioner disposed of the question of capital recovery for the canceled Pebble
Springs nuclear project with amazing brevity and clarity."'
It is an inaccurate assumption that should the Oklahoma Supreme Court
resolve the question of Black Fox, the capital recovery issue will become moot
because there are no presently announced plans for nuclear power plants in
Oklahoma. Rather, it should be anticipated that many of the same problems
that forced the cancellation of Black Fox could also lead to the termination
of coal-fired, coal gasification, and other generating facilities.
Suppose the legislature swiftly moved and amended the statutes (as above)
before the supreme court decided the Black Fox controversy? It has interesting
possibilities, especially in light of a situation developing in Massachusetts. The
Energy Users Report stated that a committee in the Massachusetts House of
Representatives may have stymied the Massachusetts Department of Public
Utilities' recent decision to allow the Boston Edison Company to recover from
its ratepayers its $204 million investment in the now defunct Pilgrim II nuclear
power plant.172 The House Committee on Government Regulations favorably
168. 541 P.2d 182, 185 (Okla. 1975).
169. OR. REv. STAT. § 757.355 (1979) (emphasis added).
170. UTm. L. REP. (State) (CCH) 23,743 (Or. Pub. Util. Comm'n Order No. 82-606, Aug.
18, 1982). The court cited to the statute and, in two sentences, ruled.
171. Id. at p. 55,272.
172. 10 ENERGY USERS REP. (BNA) 441 (May 6, 1982).
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reported legislation that would prohibit Boston Edison from recovering its
investment in Pilgrim II from ratepayers. The report noted Governor Edward
J. King's support of the legislation, although, at the time of publication, the
state senate had not addressed the issue.'"I One must reconcile this, however,
with the problem of retrospective application as an ex post facto law.
Requiring Electric Utilities to Obtain Certificates
of Convenience and Necessity
Unlike other states, Oklahoma does not require its electric utilities to ob-
tain a certificate of public convenience and necessity before commencing con-
struction of utility facilities.174 The legislature has declined to establish
specifically a construction certificate procedure for electric utilities as it has
for other types of utilities regulated by the Corporation Commission."
17
This issue has directly come into focus in Public Service Co. of Oklahoma
v. State.'"7 In this case, the Corporation Commission declined approval for
issuance of securities for P.S.O.'s Black Fox project until convinced of its
need. The court noted:
The Legislature has provided that certain public utilities acquire
certificates of public convenience and necessity, such as telephone
companies (17 O.S. 1971, § 131), operators of water transporta-
tion lines (17 O.S. 1971, § 159.12), radio common carriers (17 O.S.
1971, § 202), motor carriers (47 O.S. 1980 Supp., § 166.2), and
cotton gins (17 O.S. 1971, §§ 42-43). The conspicuous absence of
electric utilities from such a list of statutes giving the Corporation
Commission authority to approve new facilities strengthens our con-
clusion that the Legislature did not intend to require electric power
companies to obtain certificates of necessity."'
Although the court's construction of legislative intent was accurate, the
rationale for the legislative policy is not. It is absurd to believe the legislature
of Oklahoma would delegate no authority to the Commission to prohibit con-
struction of imprudent or unreasonable power-generating projects and yet re-
quire intervention for licensing of buses and cotton gins.
There is no better or more timely example of the need for reform in this
area than the Black Fox project. Although it could be reasonably presumed
that the Commission would have approved the plans of the Black Fox owners,
one cannot be certain. At the very least, Commission approval would have
173. Id.
174. A certificate of convenience and necessity is defined as a "certificate of administrative
agency (e.g.,- Public Service Commission; I.C.C.) granting operating authority for utilities and
transportation companies." BL.AcK's LAW DICTIONARY 205 (rev. 5th ed. 1979).
175. Allison, Judging the Prudence of Constructing Nuclear Power Plants: A Report to the
Oklahoma Corporation, 15 TulsA L.J. 262, 290 (1979).
176. 645 P.2d 465 (Okla. 1982).
177. Id. at 467 (emphasis added). See also Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co. v. Corporation Comm'n,
543 P.2d 546, 549-52 (Okla. 1975).
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resulted in closer scrutiny as to the project's necessity and somewhat better
forecasting. (Had this procedure been implemented at the initiation of Black
Fox, P.S.O. could have more easily justified its prudence in proceeding with
this project.)
One commentator has written:
Deferring control over imprudent construction projects until the
utility seeks to have them reflected in its allowable revenue may
be an illusory mechanism for protecting ratepayers. If the imprudent
expenditures are large, as with nuclear plants, imposing the finan-
cial burden on the stockholder may simply drive up the utility's
cost of capital, which eventually is passed on to the ratepayers.
It is desirable, therefore, for the Commission to assert its powers
to discourage imprudent utility construction before such construc-
tion is completed."8
Unfortunately, the Commission has no statutory authority for this type of
intervention. In light of the Public Service Co. and Oklahoma Gas & Electric
decisions, the Commission will continue to be unable to assert this power.
Statutory reform is needed. In the future, this may be of benefit in the preven-
tion of another Black Fox-type predicament.
"Construction Work in Progress" Policy
Another Oklahoma rate-making issue devoid of legislative direction is
whether to allow inclusion of construction work in progress (CWIP) in the
rate base. This process permits a utility to transfer the construction costs to
the ratepayer while a generating facility is in the construction stage.
Consumer interests generally oppose inclusion of CWIP in the rate base.'"
Their reasons for opposition include: (1) a desire to minimize current prices
of regulated products; (2) concern that it may be more difficult to exclude
all or a portion of an imprudent investment from the rate base after its in-
clusion during construction; (3) the desire to avoid discrimination against pre-
sent customers and in favor of future customers;80 and (4) the creation of
incentives to build costly and unnecessary plants without considering lower-
cost alternatives."'
As of 1976, thirty-five states and at least one major federal agency permitted
firms to include some portion.of CWIP in the rate base.82 Proponents for
178. Allison, supra note 167, at 291 (emphasis added). In his article, Professor Allison gives
considerable attention to a Wisconsin statutory solution. The Wisconsin plan requires utilities
desiring to construct power-generating projects to submit periodic reports prior to actual con-
struction. This mechanism is useful in preventing imprudent investments and controlling capital
expenditures. It is also another example of the type of statutory amending Oklahoma could im-
plement to meet reform objectives. See id. at 286-90.
179. GELLHOE & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 125.
180. Id. at 126.
181. 10 ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 861 (Aug. 19, 1982).
182. GELLHORN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 121. For example, the Supreme Court of Florida
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its inclusion cite equally sound reasons. First, the present value of a utility's
future costs is reduced because of the reduction in the firm's capital costs
and tax payments.83 Second, customer budgeting is made easier because the
firm's rates will go up gradually as a new facility is constructed instead of
in one large increment when a plant is completed and placed in service. ' 4
Third, the increased cash return would help the utility industry build addi-
tional plants and equipment.'5
Spiraling energy costs have brought this issue to the forefront of regulatory
disputes, particularly in the electric utility industry.86 ,In response to this con-
troversy, the Pennsylvania legislature recently passed a law disallowing rate
increases for construction work in progress at electric utility plants.' 7 The
law, signed December 30, 1982, provides for inclusion of costs of construc-
tion in progress that improve environmental or safety conditions. The law
also permits CWIP for coal conversion projects that utilize Pennsylvania coal.
Ohio Revised Code section 4909.15 provides for the inclusion of CWIP in
the rate base.'88 Oregon has utilized a legislative enactment to set construc-
tion work in progress policy.'89 However, Oklahoma has not acted legislatively
in response to CWIP. The legislature has again left it to the Commission (and
subsequently to the supreme court) to determine matters of great consequence.
Exactly what is the Corporation Commission's present-day CWIP policy?
It is not readily determinable. In the 1977 order In re Public Service Co. of
Oklahoma,'9" the Oklahoma Corporation Commission awarded the applicant
utility a $13 million CWIP sum. The Commission saw no reason to deviate
from its "standard policy" in regard to CWIP. The appropriate amount of
recently held that an electric utility can recover from its ratepayers for costs of CWIP. See 11
ENERGY UsERs REP. (BNA) 83 (Jan. 20, 1983).
183. Id. at 126.
184. Id.
185. 10 E, YR UsERs REP. (BNA) 861 (Aug. 19, 1982).
186. GE.aHORN & PIERCE, supra note 71, at 125.
187. 11 ENERGY UsEss REP. (BNA) 15 (Jan. 6, 1983). Pennsylvania Governor Richard L.
Thornburgh, who signed the bill into immediate effect on Dec. 30, 1982, stated that the law
is "a significant step in consumer protection. In this era of spiraling costs, we are committed
to do everything possible to protect consumers from unwarranted increases in their electric bill.
This legislation helps ensure that consumers only pay for the services that they can use." A
bill has been introduced at the federal level which would prevent FERC from expanding its use
of CWIP. See 10 ENERGY USERs REP. (BNA) 861 (Aug. 19, 1982).
188. Annual Report, 1980 A.B.A. SEC. Pua. Urn. L. RE'. 128.
189. OR. REV. STAT. § 757.355 (1979). The specific language of the Act can be found in the
text at note 169 supra. Notice that this able statute controls both the CWIP and the "used and
useful" property issues.
190. 22 PuB. Urn. REP. 4th (PUR) 118 (Okla. 1977). This Commission decision is recom-
mended for competent explanatory discussion on CWIP and AFUDC (Allowance for Funds Used
During Construction). Other Commission decisions dealing with CWIP and AFUDC include:
In re Oklahoma Gas & Elec. Co., 21 PuB. UT. REP. 4th (PUR) 569 (Okla. 1977); In re
Southwestern Bell Tel. Co., Cause No. 25917, Order No. 135647 (Okla. Corp. Comm'n, Nov.
21, 1977); In re Southwestern States Tel. Co., Cause No. 21584, Order No. 37112-A (Okla.
Corp. Comm'n, May 26, 1958); In re Lone Star Gas Co., Cause No. 20805, Order No. 29396
(Okla. Corp. Comm'n Nov. 5, 1954).
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CWIP to be included in the rate, according to the order, was "that portion
to be completed and in service during the twelve-month period immediately
succeeding the end of the test period."'191 The Commission concluded that
"in the long run, inclusion of CWIP in the rate base results in lower, not
higher rates to customers over the life of the property." '
The 1980 Annual Report of the American Bar Association Section on Public
Utility Law exposes the inconspicuous defect of the Commission's "standard
policy": "The Oklahoma Corporation Commission, the regulatory agency for
utility operations in the state, has had a change in the majority membership.
The Commission has adopted a strong consumer (or voter) preference at the
expense of the financial well-being of the utilities in the state."'93 This
"change" can best be illustrated by the events that occurred soon after the
1978 election. In December 1978, Oklahoma Gas and Electric Company (OG
& E) filed an application for a $93 million rate increase. After a Commission
hearing the following July, a November 1979 rate order was issued. The order
provided only $38 million in rate increases. The company was not allowed
an update of its test year to include a coal-generating plant that was com-
pleted after the filing but before the hearing. More noticeably, OG & E was
not allowed any construction work in progress.',
The demand for energy, regulatory lag, and rising costs have combined
to make CWIP a dominant controversy in the public utility arena. Under
the present statutory structure, the Oklahoma Corporation Commission is
solely responsible for its resolution. If the Commission fails in this duty, the
supreme court must "super-legislate."
There are valid arguments for and against the theory of CWIP. The elected
lawmakers of Oklahoma are best suited to represent equitably the interests
of both utility and ratepayer.
General Reform of Oklahoma's Ratepayer and Utility Protection
Mechanisms-Curtailing Commission Discretion
As previously mentioned, Oklahoma does not presently have a specific set
of statutory guidelines for Corporation Commission determination of gross
revenues, operating expenses, rate base, and rate of return, to name a few.
Proper application of these rate mechanisms is essential if an acceptable
balancing between the interests of utilities and consumers is to be reached.
Although it is "the impact of the rate order which counts,"' 5 a distinct and
uniform rate-making methodology would help ensure equitable decisions. Un-
fortunately, a goal of consistent application of the law is difficult to effec-
tuate where a lax statutory framework invites unfettered discretion.
191. 22 Pu. UrnT. REP. 4th (PUR) 118, 122 (Okla. 1977).
192. Id.
193. Annual Report, 1980 A.B.A. SEC. Pur. UT. L. REP. 128. There has since been another
general election in Oklahoma which has resulted in a change in the three-member Commission's
membership.
194. Id. at 128-29.
195. Southwestern Bell Tel. Co. v. State, 204 Okla. 225, 230 P.2d 260 (1951).
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In Merritt v. Corporation Commission,'9 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
held: "The Corporation Commission is a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and
has only such authority as is expressly or by necessary implication conferred
upon it by the Constitution and statutes of this state."'197
Is the Commission truly a tribunal of limited jurisdiction and authority?
The extent of the Commission's unfettered discretion has led one legal scholar
to inquire cogently whether the Corporation Commission is "the fourth branch
of government."198 It is difficult to argue that the Corporation Commission
has exceeded its statutory authority when the applicable statutes do not
delineate with much specificity the limitations of Commission power. An ad-
ministrative agency functioning under such general provisions has an invita-
tion to be liberal in the determination and exercise of its discretionary powers.
In order to protect the utility and the ratepayers alike, the Oklahoma
legislature should undertake an exhaustive review of the statutory basis for
Commission action. In addition, the legislature should bolster the existing
statutory rate-making provisions'99 to provide a framework'in which the Cor-
poration Commission could function more effectively.20
Through the legislative process, the citizens of Oklahoma are assured greater
control in determining important energy and public utility policy. This will
help curtail the necessity for discretionary action by administrative agencies.
In so doing, the burden placed upon the Commission and the state supreme
court will be diminished.
Conclusion
The increasing number of cancellations of partially constructed electrical
power-generating facilities exemplifies the current conflict between the demand,
the availability, and the cost of energy. This situation has produced a state
of disarray for public utilities, but especially for those utilities engaged in
nuclear power generation. The industry's predicament is to produce safe elec-
196. 438 P.2d 495 (Okla. 1968).
197. Id. at 497.
198. Interview with Professor O.M. Reynolds of the University of Oklahoma College of Law
(Sept. 10, 1982).
199. It is worthy to note an unusual provision of the Oklahoma constitution which gives the
legislature the power to alter, amend, revise, or repeal sections 18 to 34, inclusive, of article
9 of the constitution. OxrA. CoNsT. art. IX, § 35.
200. Article IX, section 25 of the Oklahoma constitution, states:
The Commission shall make annual reports to the Governor of its proceedings,
in which reports it shall recommend, from time to time, such new or additional
legislation in reference to its powers or duties, or the creation, supeivision, regula-
tion or control of corporations, or to the subject of taxation, as it may deem wise
or expedient, or as may be required by law.
The Thirty-ninth Oklahoma Legislature is considering HB 1108, which would require the
Oklahoma Corporation Commission to prepare a 10-year projection of the electrical power and
energy requirements of the state of Oklahoma and assess the need for additional or replacement
generating and transmission facilities, as well as associated costs. The bill has passed the house
and is under consideration by the senate as this article goes to press.
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trical energy, while minimizing costs to ratepayers, ensuring an adequate energy
supply for future users, and attempting to realize a profit for its investors.
Inflation, erratic growth in the need for electrical energy, and regulatory uncer-
tainties have turned the situation into a veritable quagmire.
The predominant issue facing the state public utility commissions and the
FERC is whether to permit the amortization of expenditures attributable to
abandoned power-generating projects that will never be functional or of use
to consumers. This problem is not limited to nuclear facilities alone. In view
of the aforementioned factors, the same plight may befall other future non-
nuclear power-generating projects.
The cancellation of the Black Fox nuclear project has recently brought the
issue to the forefront in Oklahoma. This situation provides a striking illustra-
tion of the uncertainty of the emerging law pertaining to capital recovery of
canceled public utility projects.
In response to the Corporation Commission's decision permitting the amor-
tization of Black Fox, the consumers must now turn to the Oklahoma Supreme
Court for relief. The court, in an attempt to balance the equities of this
dilemma, must apply a basic deferential standard of review to a situation that
has minimal precedent. However, from an examination of the record, the
court should determine that the Commission based its Black Fox order on
discretionary risk allocation, not controlling principles of law. A strict con-
struction of the case law, combined with an absence of statutory direction
for such extraordinary circumstances, will provide the court the proper basis
to reverse the Commission's order.
The court should exercise judicial boldness because it is the impact of the
rate-making process, and not the theory, that is the ultimate consideration.
Fundamental notions of equity mandate that the Black Fox loss be borne
by the stockholders, who provided the capital, took the risk on investing,
and controlled the operations of the company. Management, not the con-
sumers, should be responsible for the consequences of its own follies. To shift
the loss to the ratepayers who have received no actual benefit would be ine-
quitable. This is particularly true in Oklahoma where the statutes do not re-
quire certificates of convenience and necessity before the construction of a
public electrical generation facility. This concern for equity should preempt
any procedural or semantic arguments raised by the appellees in this case.
The ability of the utilities to pass on the economic consequences of their
planning decisions has kept the industry remarkably insulated from the
discipline and realities of the marketplace. This process must stop if the costs
are ultimately borne by the ratepayer. The utilities cannot be subsidized if
the end result is injurious to the public interest. However, in light of the
unusual nature of these events, all parties to this issue should proceed from
a negotiating-rather than a polarized-position."'
Most important, the Black Fox situation has highlighted the necessity for
201. Interview with Professor Harold W. Young, University of Oklahoma College of Law
(May 15, 1982).
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statutory reform of the laws pertaining to the Corporation Commission and
its rate-making duties. Regardless of the supreme court's decision, the
Oklahoma legislature must delineate the state's policy regarding rate-making
formulas, construction work in progress, requiring certificates of convenience
and necessity, and who shall bear the cost of abandonment, to name a few.
These are legislative decisions, not administrative, because they concern public
utilities. The legislature should proceed with diligence and responsibility to
clarify the overly broad mandates. In so doing, the opportunity for undesirable
discretionary action will be minimized, and the burden placed upon the Com-
mission and the supreme court will be diminished.
David V. Seyer
Author's Note: As this issue went to press, a decision that could have a
significant impact on the Black Fox case was handed down. In Consumers'
Counsel v. Public Utilities Commission of Ohio,2 °0 (hereinafter referred to
as Consumers' Counsel II), decided on April 13, 1983, the Ohio Supreme
Court upheld the Commission's decision to grant Cleveland Electric Illumi-
nating Company an increased rate of return on equity invested in the same
four abandoned nuclear plants that were the subject of a previous 1981 Ohio
Supreme Court decision (hereinafter referred to as Consumers' Counsel I),
which had denied capital recovery amortization into the rate base. The rate
of return increase was allowed in Consumers' Counsel II on the basis of the
increase in the investors' perceived risk following the Consumers' Counsel
I decision.
This approach by the Commission allows the utility to gain indirectly, by
means of an increased rate of return, what it was prohibited from recovering
directly through amortization. For Ohio, then, the issue is no longer whether
ratepayers should be required to bear the losses associated with nuclear plant
abandonment but when they will be required to bear such losses and in what
fashion.
In a well-reasoned dissent, Judge Locher noted that what the 1981 decision
condemned, the 1983 opinion condones. He stated that if these are "parlous"
times for the utilities industry,
then the commission and the utilities should petition the General
Assembly to enact changes in the ratemaking structure so as to
provide this extra modicum of protection for the investors. Ab-
sent such explicit statutory authorizations, however, the commis-
sion may not benefit the investors by guaranteeing the full return
of their capital at the expense of the ratepayers.203
Judge Locher criticized the majority as "falling prey to a combination of
202. 4 Ohio St. 3d 111, -N.E.2d- (1983). The 1981 case, of the same style, is discussed
in various places throughout the text and text at note 101, supra.
203. Id. at 116.
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